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The threats to international financial stability arising from 
consolidation in the financial services industry and increasing cross-
border activities by large and complex financial institutions present a 
challenge to regulation for preventing and managing financial crises. 
In Europe, the need to balance the expected benefits of financial 
integration and to contain these threats traditionally collided with the 
peculiar features of its institutional architecture. 
The internal market was built on the basis of the European 
passport, achieved by mutual recognition of national ‘harmonised’ 
regulations, and home country control. The Directives adopted in the 
early ‘90s,1 which became the milestone on the path towards 
European financial integration, were inspired by the idea that 
competition between national supervisory structures and approaches 
would have ‘naturally’ converged upon the best practices of the more 
advanced and competitive countries. The principle of mutual 
recognition for national regulations gave rise to a sort of market for 
regulation within the EU, where every country implemented banking 
regulation and supervision to strengthen the competitive advantages 
of its own domestic banks, at the same time protecting them against 
competition from foreign banks. As Padoa-Schioppa, 1999a, clearly 
foresaw, the propensity to defend national champions often prevailed 
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over the pursuit of efficiency and stability objectives. The ‘light-touch’ 
supervision adopted by some countries, such as the UK, was often 
considered by more ‘conservative’ countries such as Italy and Spain, 
as rather more of a competitive issue than as a real threat to EU 
financial stability.  
In the decades before the crisis, the European institutional 
architecture remained firmly anchored to the idea that powers and 
responsibilities for financial stability should come under the 
sovereignty of Member States. In the evolution of the regulatory and 
supervisory framework, a minimalist approach prevailed. Its main 
issues were, on the one hand, the level of harmonisation in financial 
regulation which could have been considered politically compatible 
with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, and, on the 
other, cooperation arrangements between national financial 
supervisors across countries and across sectors.  
In the Maastricht Treaty, the problems of financial stability of the 
euro area were largely undervalued. Consistently with the traditional 
narrow view of central banking based upon the Bundesbank model, 
the ECB’s mandate focused almost exclusively on price stability, 
whereas financial stability remained under the responsibility of the 
national authorities. In this respect, the sole task of the European 
System of Central Banks was “to contribute to the smooth conduct of 
policies pursued by competent authorities relating to the prudential 
supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial 
system” (TFEU, art. 127.6). Powers of supervision by the ECB were 
envisaged by the Treaty, but as a pure hypothesis, applicable only to 
“specific tasks”. Moreover, even if the ECB were to be given 
supervisory powers, they should be limited to “the credit institutions 
and other financial institutions with the exception of insurance 
undertaking” (TFEU, art. 127.7). This approach to financial 
supervision by the Treaty now seems naive, but it was the prevailing 
one in those years, when integration between the bank and insurance 
sectors were limited and the systemic risks arising from life insurance 
activities were considered unimportant (Schinasi, 2006, pp. 245 ff.; 
Persaud, 2015).  
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From the very onset, the ECB firmly maintained that its role in 
macro-prudential analysis and surveillance was closely tied to micro-
prudential supervision (Padoa-Schioppa, 1999b; Duisenberg, 2000; 
ECB, 2001; Padoa-Schioppa, 2002).2 The ECB’s position was supported 
by theoretical research, which had mostly reached a consensus on the 
most significant limits of the European supervisory architecture: the 
inconsistencies with the single monetary policy arising from the 
national mandate for financial stability, and coordination issues in 
crisis resolutions of cross-border banks (Prati, Schinasi, 1999; 
Dell’Ariccia, Marquez, 2001; and Dell’Ariccia, Marquez, 2006). 
Moreover, as markets became more integrated, the decentralised 
model of supervision entailed, for major cross-border banking groups, 
burdensome cost inefficiencies and risks of an unlevelled playing field. 
Financial industry lobbying, therefore, became the foundation of many 
proposals aimed at removing the asymmetry between the pan-
European dimension of the market and the national allocation of 
supervision (Deutsche Bank Research, 2000; European Financial 
Services Round Table, 2005).  
However, reasons for the resistance to delegating state 
sovereignty to a European supervisory body were primarily 
motivated by the crucial political problem related to the fiscal 
implications of financial stability. Oppositions to a true European 
arrangement to share the risks of financial crises among the EU 
countries were the main hurdle to centralise financial supervision at 
European-level. As it is well known, these hurdles are still in place 
(Schäuble, 2013). 
The banking union has made a quantum leap in the long journey 
towards the denationalisation of financial supervision and its 
allocation at a European level.  
                                                 
2 In 1998 at the ECB, a special committee (the Banking Supervision Committee, BSC) 
consisting of high level representatives from the ECB itself, supervisory authorities 
and central banks of all the EU Member States, has been created. The BSC has been 
one the main fora for cooperation both among the national supervisors and within the 
ESCB (Smits, 2005).  
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Although it is still incomplete, the banking union must be seen as 
a crucial innovation in the EU institutional structure for financial 
regulation. In comparison with the evolutionary process that 
characterised the EU in the previous decades, the banking union’s 
design recognises that strict complementarity between monetary and 
supervisory unification will limit the ambitions for the 
centralisalisation at the euro area level. The urgency of counteracting 
an unprecedented crisis of confidence, which undermined the very 
survival of the single currency, explains the extraordinary rapidity 
with which the design of the banking union was initially agreed upon. 
However, the current implementation of this design raises doubts as 
to whether it will be a credible solution for problems arising from the 
asymmetry between the potentially multinational contagion of 
financial fragilities and the national fiscal responsibility for crisis 
resolution.  
This work is organised as follows: the next section presents the 
evolution of the institutional arrangements for the EU financial 
regulation and supervision before the euro area crisis. The common 
narrative about the banking union often underestimates previous 
projects for the centralisation and denationalisation of the European 
financial architecture, inside and outside the ECB. Such initiatives 
had actually already come about in the theoretical and political 
debate since the early ‘90s, as a solution for negative externalities 
arising out of the development of cross-border banks and potential 
conflicts between home and host countries. The second section 
analyses the rationale of the banking union in light of the euro area 
crisis. It will focus mainly on the risks of maintaining a fragmented 
EU financial market, due to potential conflicts between euro and non-
euro countries. In order to analyse these problems, I shall analyse the 
pros and cons in the evaluations by non-euro countries about opting 
into the banking union, applying for “close collaboration” with the 
ECB. The aim of this analysis is to provide a sort of empirical test of 
the political meaning of supervisory centralisation, from a national 
perspective. Finally, some brief conclusions will be presented.  
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1. Evolution in the institutional framework of European financial 
regulation and supervision before the euro crisis 
 
The banking union is rightfully described as the most significant 
agreement since the creation of the euro, with a remarkable transfer 
of sovereignty at the European level. The true significance of the 
project should however be analysed not only as a solution to preserve 
the euro, but through the perspective of a deeper European financial 
integration (Tonveronachi, 2015). For this reason, the evolutionary 
path towards a European institutional architecture for financial 
regulation and supervision can help us to understand the rationale of 
supervisory centralisation in the design of the single market: to solve 
the asymmetry between the European dimension of financial 
vulnerabilities and the national responsibility for financial stability in 
preventing and solving a systemic bank crisis.  
After the establishment of the EMU, debates on the need for ‘more 
Europe’ in the institutional structure of financial regulation and 
supervision intensified. The varying options proposed reflected the 
need to accommodate several relevant issues: the sensitivities of 
Member States towards too much centralisation; the different ways in 
which the supervisory architecture was organised in the various 
countries; the respective roles of national central banks, integrated or 
specialised supervisory national authorities and the ECB; and, last but 
not least, the interests of financial institutions and the securities 
industry. The EU’s institutional architecture for financial supervision, 
based upon the principles of decentralisation across countries, 
segmentation across sectors, and voluntary cooperation among 
national supervisors,3 was clearly unsuitable to deal with overall 
financial stability risks arising from the internationalisation and 
conglomeration of financial firms. In relevant literature, a general 
consensus came about that the need for European arrangements for 
                                                 
3 The traditional mechanisms for voluntary cooperation were the Memoranda of 
Understanding (MoU) between central banks, supervisors and finance ministers, on 
financial crisis management of cross-border banks. The limitations of MoUs in 
achieving their goals have been fully shown (Nieto, 2007). 
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financial stability ultimately depends on cross-border externalities 
arising from European financial integration and the unavoidable 
conflicts of interest between home and host countries in a 
transnational crisis. Each European country should have a powerful 
interest in the soundness of financial institutions in the other member 
countries, because, as markets and institutions are integrated, 
idiosyncratic financial vulnerabilities could be easily transmitted 
across the overall EU financial systems via direct and indirect 
interbank linkages. However, especially during a crisis, conflicts 
mainly based on fiscal concerns tend to prevail. These conflicts can be 
accentuated if the divergence in supervisory practices stokes up 
feelings of mutual distrust and reduces the incentives for 
collaboration and the timely sharing of information (Schoenmaker, 
Oosterloo, 2005).  
According to Freixas, 2003, information asymmetries and country 
differences in prudential supervision, which characterised Europe, 
would likely lead to suboptimal decision making; this problem could 
have been reduced through cooperative decision-making and 
centralized information, provided that there were efficient incentives 
to cooperate for national supervisors. However, because each 
supervisor is concerned only with the welfare of its local stakeholders 
(political parties, investors, and tax-payers) and not with overall 
welfare (financial stability at European level), these incentives usually 
do not exist (Holthausen, Rende, 2004; Nieto, Chinasi, 2007; Eisenbeis, 
2007).  
In Europe, the political aversion of member countries to every 
type of fiscal transfer and the related issue of moral hazard have set 
up a formidable political obstacle to the acceptance of common 
binding mechanisms for risk-sharing in systemic financial crisis 
(Goodhart, 2003; Goodhart, Schoenmaker, 2006). Coordination 
failures in the ex-post bargain among home and host countries were 
thus inevitable. Experience has shown that, usually, national 
authorities are only willing to cover the domestic share of fiscal and 
deposit insurance costs arising from the bailout of their international 
banks. This inevitably happens when the size of banks is too large in 
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respect to the home country safety net, which simply cannot bear 
alone the fiscal costs of a rescue.  
Conflicts between national supervisors were worse within a 
framework of minimum harmonisation, which allowed home 
supervisors wide discretion and broad flexibility in rule 
implementation: national interests and domestic bias created strong 
incentives for loose supervision and forbearance (Kahn, Santos, 2001; 
Dell’Ariccia, Marquez, 2006). 
The trend towards cross-sector financial integration has created 
additional challenges for the European regulatory framework. Even if 
the regulatory prudential objectives of the three sectors (banking, 
insurance and securities markets) partially diverge, there could have 
been a rationale for integrating the supervisory functions in a single 
European supervisor, because the consolidation of financial services 
make all sectors of financial systems relevant for financial stability 
(Lannoo, 2002; Adenas, 2003; Wymeersch, 2010).  
The basic argument in favour of moving to a European structure 
was based on the inconsistency between the project of a single 
financial market, on the hand, and, on the other, national-based 
supervision and crisis management with only limited regulatory 
harmonisation (Thygesen, 2003). The idea that a currency union with 
free capital flows could have stability without centralised supervision 
was contested by academics, international organisations, and by the 
ECB itself (ECB, 2001; Padoa-Schioppa, 1999, and Padoa-Schioppa, 
2004). Several proposals for the Europeanisation of financial 
supervision have been set out in the literature (Di Giorgio, Di Noia, 
2001; Schoenmaker, Oosterloo, 2005; Schoenmaker, Oosterloo, 2008; 
Mortimer-Schutts, 2005). The obvious problems with these proposals 
arose from the fact that they assumed a true ‘federal structure’ for 
crisis management, in a Europe which was and is not a federal state 
and does not want to become one. If this is the case, who should bear 
the fiscal costs of possible bailouts? Decision-making regarding 
supervision and fiscal bailouts must be at the same level, according to 
the well-known motto “he who pays the piper calls the tune” 
(Goodhart, Schoenmaker, 1993, p. 3). 
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In addition to the enormous difficulties in reaching a political 
consensus on any sort of supervisory centralisation, the very existence 
of different national supervisory structures has inevitably 
complicated the emergence of an integrated system of supervisors at 
the European level. To cope with regulatory and supervisory 
challenges arising from cross-border and cross-sector European 
financial integration, the politically feasible solutions were therefore 
the following: more regulatory harmonisation, more convergence in 
supervisory practices, better law-making, and institutional 
cooperation between national supervisors. This minimalist approach 
has been adopted since the establishment of the Lamfalussy 
framework and only reinforced, with no radical changes, by the de 
Laroisère reform introduced after the first phase of the financial crisis. 
Indeed, regulatory harmonisation and more efficient law making have 
been the main objectives of the Lamfalussy framework. It represented 
a sort of political compromise between two opposite needs: that for 
supervisory centralisation, to ensure that existing rules were 
consistently implemented across all financial institutions and services, 
regardless of their home country; and the desire not to jeopardise any 
of the prerogatives of national supervisors (Lastra, 2006; Hardy, 
2009). The Lamfalussy report, however, openly recognised the limits 
of this solution: if it were found to be ineffective, the report suggested 
that “it may be appropriate to consider a Treaty change, including the 
creation of a single EU regulatory authority for financial services 
generally in the Community” (Lamfalussy et al., 2001, p. 41).  
It is interesting to note that, according to the Lamfalussy report, 
the idea of giving the ECB responsibility for micro-prudential 
supervision was rejected. The report instead explicitly foresees the 
hypothesis that supervisory powers could at some stage in the future 
be delegated to a new European financial supervisory institution: 
references to the British model of a “single supervisor” stand out 
(Goodhart, 2003; Lastra, 2003). It was no coincidence, indeed, that the 
role of non-supervisory central banks, including the ECB, was limited: 
they were only given observer status in the Committee of European 
 Centralisation of European Financial Supervision 143 
Banking Supervisors (CEBS) governing board, meaning non-voting 
seats.  
The failure of the ‘grand design’ for a European financial 
supervisor was therefore inevitable, mainly due to opposition by not 
only the ECB but also by all the national central banks, both inside and 
outside the euro-area (Lastra, 2000; Kremers et al., 2001). In 
particular, opposition by the British regulators was very strong, as was 
to be expected. This was reasserted several years later, when the crisis 
had clearly brought out the vulnerabilities of the European 
supervisory architecture:  
“[n]ow it is not the time for promoting, as some have done, a single pan-
EU regulator, either at the European Central Bank (ECB) level for the 
Eurozone or the EU level as whole. In absence of further harmonisation 
of legal underpinning, notably aspects such as insolvency and contract 
law, a single pan-EU regulator is neither a practical proposition nor 
realistic. Supervision is still very much a national responsibility and 
responsibility for ultimately bail-out a failed institution remains a 
national concern. Therefore, we continue to believe that the home 
supervisor should lead and take final decision for cross-border banks in 
a system with colleges of supervisors” (House of Lords, 2009, p. 39).  
The arguments made by the president of the Bundesbank, when 
speaking against the proposal for a centralised European banking 
supervisory body, did not differ much:  
“Europe is not yet sufficiently integrated politically for it to be possible 
to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of a centralised European 
supervisory body. It is difficult to imagine centralised banking 
supervision in Europe without having first achieved a political union in 
major areas such as taxes or legal and fiscal policy. Sovereign 
interventions on the part of a centralised authority involving, say, the 
closure of a bank or a decision on the use of national taxpayers’ money, 
for example, are unlikely to meet with much approval” (Welteke, 2000, 
p. 3). 
The financial crisis helped create, especially in core European 
countries (particularly France and Germany: Hennessy, 2014), wide 
political consensus on the need to redesign the EU financial 
supervisory architecture. Macroscopic failures of many national 
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supervisors and the ‘economic protectionism’ that had characterised 
the Member States’ responses to the financial crisis exposed the 
weaknesses of uncoordinated regulatory regimes and the need for a 
more comprehensive supervision at the European level.  
The two main planks of this reform, based on suggestions made 
in the de Larosière Report (de Larosière et al., 2009, may be summed 
up as follows: strengthening the regulatory approach of the 
Lamfalussy framework, giving to European Supervising Authorities 
(ESAs) effective rule-making and enforcement powers; and 
establishment of a macro-prudential peak, i.e. a macro-prudential 
systemic regulator, housed at the ECB. The traditional sectorial 
approach for micro-prudential supervision does not change 
(Montanaro, Tonveronachi, 2011). The de Larosière Report actually 
foresaw that it would have been perhaps appropriate for the EU 
architecture to evolve towards a twin-peaks model, with only two 
authorities: one responsible for banking, insurance and systemically 
relevant financial institutions, and the other for conduct of business 
and market issues (de Larosière et al., 2009, p. 58).4 The obvious 
problem of guaranteeing an effective link between micro- and macro-
prudential supervision was raised by the ECB, which unsuccessfully 
tried to advocate a role in banking micro-prudential supervision too. 
The de Larosière Report however rejected this hypothesis: 
“adding micro-supervisory duties could impinge on its fundamental 
mandate [monetary stability]; at the same time, the ECB’s involvement 
in crisis management might have jeopardised its very independence” 
(de Larosière et al., 2009, pp. 43-44). 
                                                 
4 In line with these suggestions, in the Regulation founding ESAs it is explicitly stated 
(art. 81) that the Commission must review, every three years, the work done by the 
Authorities, especially to assess whether “it is appropriate to continue separate 
supervision of banking, insurance, occupational pensions, securities and financial 
markets; [and] it is appropriate to undertake prudential supervision and supervise 
the conduct of business separately or by the same supervisor”. In the first report on 
the ESAs operations published in 2014, the European Commission outlines that “[c]all 
for structural changes, such as merging the authorities into a single seat or introducing 
a twin-peaks approach, should be carefully assessed in light of the establishment of 
Banking Union (European Commission, 2014, p. 11).  
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Under the so-called European System of Financial Supervision 
established by the de Laroisière reform, the home-country control 
principle remained substantially unchanged. Responsibility for direct 
supervision is held entirely by competent national authorities.5 
Recognising that supervision may have fiscal consequences, the 
reform explicitly introduced the “fiscal safeguard clause”, under which 
no decisions adopted by the ESAs should impinge in any way on the 
fiscal responsibilities of Member States. According to Goodhart, 
Schoenmaker, 2006, “leaving expensive crisis management at national 
level, while shifting supervisory powers towards the supra-national 
level, could be described as national taxation without proper control 
and national representation” (p. 43). 
In order to promote regulatory convergence across the EU, the 
ESAs have an important regulatory power, which they should perform 
by issuing a “single rulebook”, or binding regulatory technical 
standards to implement rules delegated by EU directives and 
regulations and endorsed by the Commission.6 The single rulebook 
introduces in the European financial regulatory framework a 
maximum harmonisation approach (Babis, 2014): under this profile, 
the European continental position prevailed against the position 
sustained by the UK, which until the very last moment tried to protect 
British sovereignty in the oversight of the City (Financial Services 
Authority, 2009). 
Recent experience shows that it is plausible that the national 
supervisory authorities involved in the boards of supervisors of ESAs 
reach decisions in regulatory matters by trying to reach an acceptable 
compromise between the need for a European view and the 
desirability of securing national interests. However, mainly in times of 
                                                 
5 As demonstrated, for instance, by the strong hostility of Member States against 
attributing the EBA powers for giving direct instructions to banks. The compromise 
solution was that the EBA can only overrule a national supervisory authority in 
narrowly-defined emergency situations.  
6 For banking, EBA is currently mandated to produce a single rulebook for the 
implementation of the CRD/CRR package and BRRD. The ESAs were also tasked to 
issue guidelines or recommendations, non-binding legal acts that national authorities 
should apply under the ‘comply or explain’ mechanism.  
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crisis, it is likely that divergent national interests will put pressure on 
cross-border cooperation on regulatory and supervisory matters.  
“The ESAs are required to take action through their respective Board of 
Supervisors in the sole interest of the European Union. While the shift 
away from a decision-making process based on consensus to actual 
voting is a step forward, the predominant role of representatives of 
NACs [National Competent Authorities] in the decision-making process 
has given rise to some criticism. In particular, concerns prevail that 
national views rather than EU-wide interests dominate the proceedings” 
(European Commission, 2014, p. 9). 
According to the chairman of the EBA (Enria, 2015), the single 
rulebook is a great step forward but it is not enough to fully harmonise 
financial regulation across EU countries. The existence of many 
national options and discretion within the Capital Requirements 
Regulation and Directive (CRDIV/CRR) and the Bank Recovery and 
Resolution Directive (BRRD), often used for protectionist purposes 
and supervisory forbearance, limits the effectiveness of the single 
rulebook. At the same time, decentralised day-by-day supervision may 
not ensure convergence in supervisory practices. The experience of 
ECB’s senior staff responsible for the Single Supervisory Mechanism, 
on the ways in which European law has been transposed into national 
law and how the respective national supervisors have applied national 
and European law in practice, has shown even greater differences than 
what they had expected (Lautenschläger, 2015). 
The ‘lessons from the crisis’ have been the main argument in 
favour of the banking union for both EU policymakers and the 
mainstream of the literature, who conceive of the banking union as the 
necessary complement to monetary unification. It is however only an 
apparent paradox that the crisis experience has also shown the 
inconsistency of the objective of European regulatory centralisation 
with large economic, fiscal and financial divergences between 
European countries (Montanaro, Tonveronachi, 2012). The crisis has 
unfailingly brought up, once again, the unresolved question of 
distribution of the costs and benefits of financial openness among 
countries. It is therefore no coincidence that, in the wake of the crisis, 
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critics of centralisation maintain for Europe a ‘more nation’ solution 
(Financial Services Authority, 2009; Pistor, 2010; Persaud, 2015) in 
line with the national mandate for financial stability. According to this 
view, more powers should be attributed to the host supervisor, 
including the power to impose the subsidiarisation of systemically 
relevant foreign branches. A similar approach, in many respects, has 
the merit of being consistent: it recognises that, insofar as the 
institutional arrangements for EU financial stability cannot be set-up, 
acceptance of a radical reversal of financial integration is inevitable. 
The experience of the globalisation of finance clearly has shown that:  
“[the] benefits of the openness in financial markets are conditional, 
complex, and in places suspect and should therefore not be the altar 
upon which we sacrifice host country regulation of finance” (Persaud, 
2015, p. 232).  
As we will see below, the negative stance towards the banking 
union of several non-euro countries arises from serious stability 
concerns, which, in the light of experience, one cannot simply discard 
as ‘banking nationalism’. 
 
 
2. The banking union in the single market: two mutually 
reinforcing processes? 
 
As the euro area crisis erupted in the mid-2012, threatening the 
very existence of the EMU, the announcement of the banking union 
was intended to confirm the political commitment of Member States 
to preserving the integrity of the euro and the single market. The risk 
of fragmentation of EU banking markets undermined the single 
market and impaired the effective transmission on the monetary 
policy to the real economy (European Commission, 2012). The two 
objectives, integrity of the euro area and integrity of the EU single 
market, were closely interconnected. Completing the EMU with a 
deeper economic and monetary union was to safeguard the 
integration of EU banking market, benefitting also non-euro countries 
(European Council, 2012). 
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“The creation of the banking union must not compromise the unity and 
integrity of the single market which remains one of greatest 
achievement of European integration. […] The single market and the 
banking union are thus mutually reinforcing processes” (European 
Commission, 2012).  
With these objectives in mind, the euro area Member States were 
ready to accept a transfer of their sovereign powers in banking 
supervision and resolution at the European level. The immediate 
transfer of supervisory powers to a single euro area supervisor – the 
ECB – was actually the prerequisite to the direct recapitalisation of 
weak banks by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), without 
overburdening the already indebted Member States. The very 
rationale of the banking union, however, went well beyond this: it was 
intended to correct the flawed design of the monetary union. The 
policies, inspired from a dramatic misdiagnosis, according to which 
the source of the euro crisis was the peripheral government’s 
profligacy, had actually accentuated the interactions between fiscal 
and banking fragilities.  
Following the euro crisis, tensions and distrust seriously 
undermined the credibility of the EU institutions and the 
attractiveness of joining the euro-zone. The benefits of sharing 
monetary and financial sovereignty have actually become more 
uncertain. In light of this, if the banking union were to be one of the 
building blocks necessary and mutually reinforcing towards “a 
genuine monetary union” (Van Rompuy, 2012), its major challenge 
should eventually be to be able to create adequate incentives for 
acceptance by Member States of limiting the powers of the financial 
safety net at the national level in favour of an increased role of 
European institutions.  
Within the new harmonised EU regulatory framework based on 
CRDIV/CRR for banking prudential supervision and BRRD for crisis 
management, the banking union’s two first pillars, the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism 
(SRM) should guarantee uniform implementation of the rulebook for 
banks in the euro area and in non-euro countries who wish to opt-in 
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to the SSM, applying for a “close cooperation” with the ECB.7 Under the 
principle of “aligning liability and control”, supervision, fiscal 
responsibility of resolution of ailing banks and deposit insurance 
should have been denationalised within a ‘quasi federal’ structure, 
becoming neutral with respect to the nationality of banks (De Grauwe, 
2011; Véron, 2011; Gros, 2012). One integrated banking system may 
survive with monetary unification, if the sovereigns’ credit worthiness 
does not affect banks’ borrowing costs (Tonveronachi, 2014). The 
principle that the banks themselves and their creditors would cover 
the costs of bank rescues safeguards the system against the moral 
hazard of banks and governments. However, this is only credible if the 
size of the financial systems is aligned with each country’s economic 
and fiscal strength (Montanaro, Tonveronachi, 2012). Nevertheless, 
since regulators have been unwilling or unable to decisively cut the 
growth of financialisation, in extreme situations a fiscal common 
backstop to privately funded resources become necessary, so that the 
costs to taxpayers of banking rescues would be independent of banks’ 
nationality (Valiante, 2014; Schoenmaker, 2015).  
The SSM, centralised within the ECB, is fully operational: together 
with the single rulebook, identical supervisory practices for all banks 
in the euro-area should restore confidence in the European banking 
sector. The second pillar, the SRM, became effective in January 2016. 
However, the adequacy of its financial resources crucially remain an 
unresolved issue and undermines the effectiveness of the banking 
union’s design in achieving the goal of breaking the link between 
sovereigns and their banking systems. The use of the Single Resolution 
Fund (SRF) for a bank resolution8 will be progressively “mutualised” – 
                                                 
7 The ECB will assess whether the preconditions for such “close cooperation” have 
been met with an “entrance examination” such as the Asset Quality Review, which the 
ECB implemented in 2014 for significant banks in the euro area Member States. The 
close cooperation regime binds the Member States for three years, and they can 
request the termination of the cooperation at any time thereafter (ECB, Decision of 31 
January 2014, ECB/2014/5). 
8 SRF resources are to be tapped only after other sources, under the hierarchy defined 
by the BRRD, have been exhausted. This hierarchy starts with shareholders, followed 
by ‘bail-in-able’ creditors, then any extraordinary national public financial support 
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i.e. transformed from costs largely paid by the single Member States 
concerned into costs shared by all euro area countries – over an eight-
year period (Zavvos, Kaltsouni, 2015).9 During the long transitional 
period until the full capitalisation of the SRF, expected to last at least 
until 2024, the inconsistency arising from the fact that decisions on 
supervision and resolution are moved to a central level, whereas part 
of the costs will still be borne at the national level, is perpetuated, 
maintaining market fragmentation. The political agreements for a 
mutualised backstop to the Single Resolution Fund, done through a 
credit line from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to the SRF, 
as suggested by the Five Presidents’ Report (Juncker et al., 2015), have 
been postponed until the end of the transitional period (European 
Council, 2015).  
The fiscal backstop of last resort should be the ESM direct 
recapitalisation instrument (DRI) that, in exceptional circumstances, 
would allow systemic banks to strengthen their capital position 
without placing an unsustainable burden on fiscally weak countries. It 
was assumed that including the DRI in the funding arrangements of 
the SRM would contribute to cut the link between troubled institutions 
and their sovereigns:  
“the objective of an ESM direct recapitalisation shall to preserve the 
financial stability of the euro area as a whole and its Member States in 
line with Article 3 of the ESM Treaty, and to help remove the risk of 
contagion for financial sector to the sovereign by allowing the 
recapitalisation of institutions directly”.10 
                                                 
(under EU State aid rules), and finally the resources of the national deposit guarantee 
schemes. Only when these resources reached at least 8% of the liabilities of the failing 
bank, would available SRF resources be used.  
9 The SRF will not reach its steady-state size of approximately 55 billion euros until 
2024. Because the structure of separate and national compartments during the 
transition phase to full mutualisation will limit the borrowing capacity of the SRF in 
the coming years, the fund could suffer capacity constraints particularly in its early 
years, and might be unable to provide adequate funding for a large bank resolution. 
The debate on different options of national bridge financing is still open (European 
Commission, 2015a). 
10 Eurogroup (2013), “ESM Direct Bank Recapitalisation Instrument – Main Features 
of the Operational Framework and way forward”, Luxembourg, June 20, available at 
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However, after the worst stage of the euro crisis began to ease, 
thanks to the resolute commitment of the ECB president “to do 
whatever it takes to preserve the euro” (Draghi, 2012) and the 
announcement by the ECB of the Outright Monetary Transactions 
programme, traditional opposition against all fiscal transfers between 
EU member countries began to resurface. Again, the blame for the 
crisis was put on the “fiscal profligacy” of the peripheral countries. The 
predictable result seems to be that of the original premises of the 
banking union, that is the centralisation of the fiscal backstop for bank 
resolution will become a very remote line of defence of last resort, 
subject moreover to unanimous consent of all ministers of finance of 
the euro area Member States.11 Uniform application of bail-in rules, 
together with access to the Single Resolution Fund under a centralised 
decision-making structure, are instead expected to become the key 
instruments for both weakening the link between banks and 
sovereigns and avoiding distortion of competition.12 However, the 
untested impact of the bail-in framework on financial stability, mainly 
in the event of a systemic cross-border bank crisis (Dewatripont, 
2014), leaves open large political discretion due to these two, 
potentially conflicting, objectives.  
“The interaction of the BRRD’s principal legal policy, which is to ensure 
that henceforth the taxpayer’s part in the resolution burden-sharing will 
be confined to the bare minimum, with the political wrangling relating 
to the mutualisation of resolution financing, has transformed subtly but 
profoundly the fundamental rationale of the Banking Union” 
(Hadjiemmanuil, 2015, p. 18). 
The preconditions for ESM support (European Stability Mechanism, 
2014) are actually much stricter than those expressly envisaged by the 
BRRD for public bail-out of troubled banks (via the Government Financial 
                                                 
the URL http://www.eurozone.europa.eu/media/436873/20130621-ESM-direct-
recaps-features.pdf 
11 ESM Treaty, art. 5(6).  
12 Under the SRM regulation, the Commission’s State aid competences in all resolution 
involving support that qualifies as State aid are preserved. According to the ECB, 2013, 
concerns remain that the State aid control could hinder the achievement of the 
financial stability objective of resolution.  
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Stabilisation Tool), as a last-resort option “in the very extraordinary 
situation of systemic crisis”.13 These preconditions clearly confirm the 
political will to shift “the bulk of potential financing from the ESM to the 
institutions themselves, along with their investors and creditors” 
(European Stability Mechanism, 2014), rendering the likelihood of the 
use of the common fiscal backstop no more than a remote possibility.14 
This creates the risk of undermining the credibility of the banking union’s 
design as a solution to the fragmentation of the internal market and the 
conflicts between home and host countries arising from the respective 
fiscal constraints in safeguarding national financial stability. These 
concerns can be read in the Five President’s Report, which envisages that 
“[i]n due course, the effectiveness of the ESM’s direct bank 
recapitalisation instrument should be reviewed, especially given the 
restrictive eligibility criteria currently attached to it, while respecting 
the agreed bail-in rules” (Juncker et al., 2015, p. 11). 
In any case, it is important to note that the DRI is restricted to euro 
area countries; this explains the lack of any reference to ESM support 
in the SRM regulation, which applies to euro countries as well as to 
non-euro countries opting in to the banking union. To date, “the 
importance of equal treatment between the euro area and non-euro 
area SSM/SRM participants” establishing, for non-euro countries 
participating into the banking union, “equivalent support mechanism 
[to ESM support]” (Council of the European Union, 2013) remained no 
more than a mere declaration of intent.  
                                                 
13 BRRD, art. 56-58. 
14 Eligible for ESM intervention are only systemically relevant credit institutions, 
which should be directly supervised by the ECB. Private capital resources should 
engage first, with full bail-in cascade and the maximum contribution of the single 
resolution fund allowable under the SRM regulation. After industry-financed 
backstops, national fiscal backstop too should be exhausted before the ESM 
intervention: the requesting Member State should contribute financially to 
recapitalisation, even if the DRI is reserved to Member States whose fiscal conditions 
are already considered at risk. Finally, the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF 
(the “troika”) will negotiate with the requesting Member State a memorandum of 
understanding detailing the policy conditions relating to the beneficiary institution as 
well as the country’s banking sector and macroeconomic policies. 
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Centralisation of the deposit guarantee at the euro area level is 
the third pillar of the banking union, which is, however, still missing. 
The absence of a common deposit insurance scheme means that 
depositors remain vulnerable to national fragilities. At the same time, 
as responsibility for supervision and resolution are centralised as a 
result of the SSM and SRM, the conditions in which a national deposit 
insurance scheme must pay out insured depositors or contribute to a 
resolution are no longer under national control. The scope of this 
crucial common safety net should therefore coincide with that of the 
SSM.15 The proposal for the creation of a European Deposit Insurance 
Scheme (EDIS), presented by the Commission “in the broader context 
of completing the Banking Union and the necessary additional 
measures of risk sharing and risk reduction in the banking sector” 
(European Commission, 2015c), has proved politically contentious for 
several countries. A notable objection has been made by Germany, 
which, together with others, is firmly opposed to any form of fiscal 
mutualisation, fearing a political backlash to the idea that the German 
fully prefunded scheme could be used to guarantee the deposits of 
savers in other European countries (Brunsden, 2015).16  
                                                 
15 According to Gros, 2015, the EDIS should be devised as a permanent re-insurance 
system at the EU level for national deposit guarantee schemes: therefore, due its 
macroeconomic function, it should have a structure separate from and independent 
of the SRM.  
16 At the informal ECOFIN of 12 September 2015, the German finance ministry 
declared opposition to the EDIS proposal, which, in its view, represents a further 
mutualisation of bank risks (Financial Times Brussels blog, 2015). On 24 November 
2015, the EDIS proposal has been officially presented by the European Commission, 
2015b. The EDIS would consist of a re-insurance of national deposit guarantee 
schemes, moving after three years to a co-insurance scheme, and, as a final stage, to a 
full European Deposit Insurance Scheme, which is envisaged by 2024. To take into 
account the German position, the Commission committed itself to pursue a full 
package of measures aimed at containing moral hazard and limiting the exposures of 
banks to national sovereign risk. As has been recognised by the European Systemic 
Risk Board, 2015, stricter prudential treatment of sovereign exposures may however 
generate potential instability in sovereign credit markets, mainly for countries where 
banks have large sovereign debt exposures (as a proportion of total assets), such as 
Belgium, Spain, Greece, Italy and Portugal.  
154  PSL Quarterly Review 
The design of the banking union, even if it still lacks the elements 
needed to ensure a true de-nationalisation of banks’ creditworthiness, 
is an important change in the EU institutional regulatory structure. It 
should raise the credibility and quality of banking supervision in the 
euro area, eliminating the home bias prevalent in national supervision 
and the conflicts between home and host supervisors, reversing the 
renationalisation of banks which had taken place since the crisis. For 
major cross-border banks, the centralisation of supervision at the EU 
level certainly fulfils an old aspiration. The removal of any barriers to 
cross-border banking which may be in place to protect national 
interest would lead to lower bank compliance costs and more freedom 
of choice between centralised or decentralised structures for capital 
and liquidity allocation in different markets in the banking union area. 
However, as Constâncio has recognised, the impact of the banking 
union  
“will clearly depend on how many Member States eventually decide to 
join. In our view, the more Member States take part, the better it will be 
for the functioning of the ESFS and the single market more generally” 
(Constâncio, 2013).  
It is exactly this issue that I will focus on in the rest of this section, 
without pretence to address all problems posed by the banking union. 
Let us only examine the problem of whether the banking union, 
designed primarily for euro area countries, can be truly attractive for 
non-euro Members States, which are invited to accede. 
 
2.1. Attractiveness of the banking union for non-euro Member States 
 
Coexistence in the single market of SSM and non-SSM countries 
might compromise the objective of solving the traditional home-host 
divide in EU cross-border banking supervision and resolution 
(D’Hulster, 2011). If a majority of non-euro EU countries decided to 
opt-out, the risk of financial fragmentation inside the single market 
would be maintained. 
The balkanisation of the single market, which stems from the 
financial crisis, has worsened the conflicts of interest between home 
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and hosts supervisors, due to the lack of ex-ante binding agreements 
for crisis risk sharing. These conflicts, arising from different mandates 
and different interests of their national stakeholders, could be 
eliminated if the institutional mechanisms of the banking union were 
considered suitable safeguards for the interest of all EU members, and 
not merely those in the euro area. Only in such a case could the 
countries outside the euro area decide to opt into the banking union, 
especially if they are not committed to joining the euro in a short time 
(Darvas, Wolff, 2013). 
By splitting the EU into the 19 euro-area members and the 9 outs, 
the banking union covers over 70% of total EU banking assets, but the 
intensity of cross-border banking in non-euro countries is higher than 
in the euro area (Schoenmaker, 2015). The UK, which has already 
declared that it does not want to join the banking union (House of 
Lords, 2012), and Sweden host five global systemically important 
banks (G-SIBs: HSBC, Barclays, Royal Bank of Scotland, Standard 
Chartered, and Nordea), which have significant subsidiaries and 
branches inside the euro area. Most of these subsidiaries are 
supervised by the ECB. At the same time, many parent banks inside the 
euro area have a substantial network of subsidiaries mainly in the EU 
non-euro countries.17 For the moment, non-euro authorities supervise 
these subsidiaries. For non-euro countries, the advantages of joining 
the banking union may be limited by the possibility of having to give 
up prudential powers that host countries have over the subsidiaries of 
foreign banks. 
The example of the Italian Unicredit Group, which is subject to 
direct supervision by the ECB as consolidate supervisor, and to the 
supervision by six non-euro Central and Eastern European (CEE) host 
countries, may be a good way of showing this situation.18 According to 
                                                 
17 The CEE non-euro countries include Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Romania. 
18 According to the CRDIV/CRR, host countries are tasked of authorising and 
supervising legally independent subsidiaries, in cooperation with the consolidating 
home country supervisor (the ECB, for SSM members). The colleges of supervisors are 
the mandatory vehicles of this cooperation; the EBAs’ decisions are binding for 
settling disputes between home and host supervisors.  
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the last CEE Banking Sector Report (Raiffeisen Research, 2015) 
Unicredit Group’s presence in the CEE region is one of the largest 
among Western European banks: the group’s divisions in this area 
provide approximately 20% of the groups profits, most of this coming 
from the Polish division (see table 1). 
 
 
Table 1 – Geographical distribution of Unicredit subsidiaries in 
European non-SSM countries as of 31 December 2014 
 
 Market share 
Operating 
Income (% of 
group total) 
          Number of  
      employees (% of  
          group total) 
Bulgaria 17% 2% 3.4% 
Croatia 26.4% 3% 3.5% 
Czech Republic      9.1% 3% 2.8% 
Hungary 6.4% 2% 1.7% 
Poland 10.6% 8% 14.6% 
Romania 7.2% 2% 3% 
Total outside SSM 19% 29% 
Notes: markets share measures the importance of the subsidiary for the host country; since 
disaggregated asset values are not available, operating income and the number of employees are 
assumed as proxies for measuring the importance of the subsidiary for the parent bank home 
country. 
Source: Unicredit (2015), 2014 Integrated Report, Milan: Unicredit Group. 
 
 
From the perspective of all CEE host countries, the Unicredit 
subsidiaries are systemic or significant, even though, with the 
exception of the Polish one, they are relatively small in relation to the 
group’s size. The Unicredit case illustrates well the typical features of 
the dominant presence of euro area banks in the banking systems of 
many CEE countries. Will the maintenance of financial stability in the 
host CEE countries be of interest to the ECB, even if they have marginal 
weight in the euro area? According to the Vienna Initiative, 2014, this 
is one of the most relevant concerns about the possible option of 
joining the banking union.  
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By centralising supervision at the ECB, supervisory standards 
could be expected to improve in quality; and implementation of the 
single rulebook should become more harmonised and consistent. 
However, a mismatch is created between supervisory powers, 
transferred to the ECB, and responsibilities for the consequences of 
supervisory decisions. National authorities of host countries will not 
be responsible for the supervision of domestic banks, but will still bear 
the fiscal and stability costs that may arise from supervisory failures. 
The coordination between home and host countries participating in 
the banking union would move from colleges to the ECB’s Supervisory 
Board, but this does not eliminate potential conflicts of interest in a 
crisis, when host countries may feel that their national stability is 
threatened.  
Traditional ring-fencing measures that the host countries used to 
apply would clearly no longer be allowed if they joined the banking 
union, but there is no guarantee that they will be able to take 
advantage of the euro area safety net (Lehmann, Nyberg, 2014). A 
Single Supervisory Mechanism without this guarantee will not set the 
right incentives for national authorities.  
Non-euro countries lack the support of ECB liquidity during a crisis; 
this is particularly relevant for CEE countries, with extensive euro-
denominated lending (Yeşin, 2013). Moreover, as we have already seen, 
non-euro countries cannot accede to financial support from the ESM, 
which is only provided for “member States whose currency is the euro” 
(European Stability Mechanism, 2012, whereas 2). 
Clearly, if the banking union were to involve only a subset of EU 
nations, there would be a risk of conflicts inside the single market, 
between the objectives of harmonised regulation and decentralised 
supervision and resolution. This would mean that 
“the repair of the single market will proceed with different speed and 
will be driven by different priorities within and outside the SSM 
jurisdiction. We cannot rule out the possibility that a rift opens up in the 
Single Market between Member States adhering to the SSM and SRM, 
and those that continue to rely on national tools for supervision and 
resolution” (Enria, 2013). 
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The ECB will be, in many aspects, a more authoritative supervisor 
than most non-member countries’ supervisors, perhaps only 
excluding the Bank of England. The ECB has not only its strong political 
reputation to defend, but also wide regulatory powers. The latter may 
be, however, at least partly in conflict with those of the EBA. Legally, 
after the introduction of the SSM the role of the EBA in developing 
regulatory standards and contributing to the consistent application of 
the single rulebook across the whole Union has been strengthened by 
giving it the task of developing a single supervisory handbook.19 
According to SSM regulation, the ECB shall adopt guidelines and make 
recommendations, but it should be subject to the binding EBA’s rules 
and decisions. Nevertheless, the risk that the ECB partially takes over 
EBA’s functions, at least within the SSM, cannot be excluded, given 
regulatory ambiguities.20  
The issue of the potential conflicts between the ECB and the EBA 
(Enria, 2013; Tröger, 2013) is particularly serious, especially in light 
of the different representation and voice that non-euro countries have 
in the governance structure and in decision-making processes within 
the two authorities. Under the banking union, only euro Member 
States have a seat on the ECB Governing Council, which can overrule 
                                                 
19 Regulation (EU) n. 1022 of 22 October 2013, amending Regulation (EU) n. 
1093/2010, whereas 7 and art. 8, 1aa.  
20 Whereas the EBA is preparing to draw up its supervisory handbook (European 
Banking Authority, 2015), the ECB has already prepared a Supervisory Manual, an 
internal document which describes to SSM staff the processes, procedures and 
methodologies for the supervision of significant and less significant banks. There are 
likely to be many overlaps between the two handbooks. For instance, in the area of 
internal models approaches and validation, where the CRDIV/CRR left significant 
room for flexibility and discretionary powers, the EBA’s guidelines will find it difficult 
to influence the approaches adopted by the ECB’s Internal Model Division (European 
Central Bank, 2015b). The ECB also intend to play an incisive role in the 
harmonisation of prudential regulation inside the banking union, by reducing the 
options and discretions in the CRDIV/CRR (currently more than 150), which can be 
exercised by national governments, regulatory authorities, or both, depending on the 
case (European Central Bank, 2015a). Finally, while the EBA is responsible for 
initiating and coordinating EU-wide stress tests, it is the responsibility of the ECB to 
conduct them for significant banks inside the SSM. There is ambiguity regarding who 
will have overall responsibilities for them.  
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decisions by the ECB Supervisory Board, where non-euro country 
members of the SSM enjoy voting rights. The ECB is not formally 
represented on the EBA board, which is exclusively made up of the 
national authorities of Member States. The Regulation governing the 
EBA has been modified, precisely to guarantee parity between SSM 
and non-SSM members, requiring a double majority in both groups in 
the decisions of EBA’s Board of Supervisors.  
To date, no non-euro countries have formally applied to the ECB 
for close cooperation. The UK and Sweden have already decided to 
remain outside the eurozone, whereas Denmark, Bulgaria, and 
Romania have expressed their desire to opt-in. The other non-euro 
countries for the moment want to ‘wait and see’, but the stance seems 
as a whole to be negative.  
In order to empirically test the preferences of non-euro countries 
in joining the banking union, I have analysed the pros and the cons of 
opting-in considered by each country, in all the official and unofficial 
documents I have been able to find.21 My analysis includes all non-euro 
countries, except the UK. Indeed, the UK is a case unto itself, because 
it is a global financial player, but even more so, because of the vision 
the British have always had on the EU single market, the only purpose 
of which is to ensure that London’s pre-eminence as a financial market 
is not jeopardised.  
In light of the assessments made by non-euro countries, the 
results of my test ought to show the weak points in the design of the 
banking union. These may even undermine one of its main objectives: 
that of reducing fragmentation in the EU single market.  
For each country, table 2 gives some indicators, which are 
generally supposed to be significant in choosing whether to opt-in: the 
fiscal costs of the last crisis, the degree of bankarisation, the 
importance of foreign banks in the national banking system, and bank 
health (measured by the percentage of non-performing loans). 
 
                                                 
21 The information I have been able to find is not equally significant for all countries, 
since for some of them (Croatia and Bulgaria) there were no official documents. The 
documents I have utilised for the analysis are listed in Annex.  
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Table 2 – Non-euro countries: financial indicators 
 
 
Financial 
crisis fiscal 
costs/GDP 
Bank 
assets/GDP  
Foreign 
branches and 
subsidiaries’ 
assets/total 
assets 
Non-
performing 
loans/total 
gross loans 
Bulgaria – 1.1 76% 16.6% 
Croatia – 1.2 90% 16.7% 
Czech 
Rep. 
– 1.2 91% 5.7% 
Denmark 3.1% 4.2 12% 4.5% 
Hungary 2.7% 1 47% 15.6% 
Poland – 0.9 59% 4.9% 
Romania – 0.6 90% 15.3% 
Sweden 3.6% 2.8 6% 0.6% 
Notes: the figures reported are for year 2008 for the fiscal costs of the crisis, and 2014 for all 
other indicators. 
Sources: for the fiscal costs of the crisis, Laeven, Valencia, 2012; for bank assets and foreign 
branches and subsidiaries assets, ECB Statistical Data Warehouse; for non-performening loans, 
World Bank. 
 
There is a clear distinction between the two Nordic and the CEE 
countries, as can be seen in the higher degree of financialisation and 
the lower relevance of foreign banks. The major Swedish and Danish 
banks, though, have several significant subsidiaries in the euro area, 
directly supervised by the ECB.  
The incentives to join the banking union should be, on the one 
hand, that a single supervisor would imply lower costs for cross-
border banks in complying with the regulatory requirements. On the 
other hand, perhaps even more important, is the issue of the 
sustainability of fiscal costs of a systemic banking crisis, which, as the 
estimated figures for 2008 show, may be particularly high given the 
high level of financialisation in the two Nordic countries. Thus, as long 
as the conditions for a common fiscal backstop are not agreed upon, 
the incentives to join the banking union are reduced. This is a major 
point in Sweden, where the traditional political preference for “gold 
plating” in banking regulation and for public solutions in crisis 
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management were recently confirmed with callings for more 
flexibility in the BRRD concerning tapping the resolution fund and 
applying the bail-in tool (Eliasson et al, 2014). The opposite approach, 
adopted by Denmark, may be one of the reasons why this country has 
decided to opt-in (Asmussen, 2013; Hakkarainen, 2014; Montanaro, 
2016). 
In all the CEE countries, significant euro area banks directly 
supervised by the ECB have a dominant presence, mainly ones from 
Austria, France and Italy. In Bulgaria and Romania, not coincidentally 
the only opt-in countries, the presence of Greek banks is significant: 
the crisis’s spill-over effects has been severe, and some form of 
support by the ECB has been necessary to contain contagion and 
deposit flights (Noonan, 2015). Only in Hungary and Poland does the 
domestic banking system have a significant role.  
With the Czech Republic and Poland being the only exceptions, in 
the CEE countries the weakness of economic activity has given rise to 
a great incidence of non-performing loans in banks’ portfolios. Joining 
the SSM would likely result in a tough asset quality review and stress 
testing, with possible adverse effects in terms of deleveraging 
processes. Supervisory quality, but also the flexibility and 
‘forbearance’ considered necessary by national governments may 
therefore influence any decision to opt-in, in opposite directions. The 
size of national fiscal backstops and, clearly, the commitment to adopt 
the euro in short time are important elements too (International 
Monetary Fund, 2015). 
Finally, political factors also count. After the euro crisis, citizens’ 
trust in the European institutions has fallen: this cannot fail to 
influence the countries’ stance towards the banking union. Bank 
regulation is one of the most sensitive areas for national policymakers: 
a transfer of sovereignty at the EU level is very difficult to decide for, 
if voters cannot clearly see its advantages. 
Overall, the results of the research on the reasons for opting in or 
opting out are presented in table 3.  
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3. Conclusions 
 
Following monetary unification, the asymmetry between cross-
border and cross-sectors financial integration and national allocation 
of supervisory powers and crisis management responsibility was a 
major institutional challenge for the EU single market. In the aftermath 
of the 2008 financial crisis, the EU financial regulation architecture 
shifted from decentralisation and mutual recognition of home rules 
and supervisory practices to a progressive regulatory harmonisation. 
Strengthening cross-border cooperation between supervisors and 
central banks, improving convergence in supervisory practices, and 
reducing the room for national discretions, were considered the main 
instruments to reconcile divergence between the European market 
dimension and the national and sectorial dimension of financial 
supervision. The limited supervisory powers given to the new 
authorities in the European system of financial supervisors clearly 
showed strong political resistances to centralisation by Member 
States and their supervisors. 
The ECB’s direct supervision of major banks with headquarters in 
the euro area and the centralised resolution process and funding 
structure  introduced   by  the  banking  union   move  the  European 
institutional architecture from the previous framework of 
coordination and regulatory harmonisation to a supervisory 
centralisation at the euro area level. For this reasons, the banking 
union project launched in 2012 was a quantum leap in the process of 
EU financial integration. 
The design of the banking union arose as a response to the euro area 
crisis, to halt the fragmentation of the EU internal market and doubts 
about the ‘singleness’ of the euro. Its objective was the 
‘denationalisation’ of supervisory powers aimed at ensuring that 
banks in the euro area should be considered precisely as euro area 
banks, and not as banks subjected to one or more national supervisors, 
more or less reliable, depending on the fiscal strength of the country 
where they are headquartered. Recognising that “ultimately the euro 
area did not succeed in achieving sustainable financial integration”,  
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the banking union should be “laying the foundation for more complete 
financial integration in the future” (Draghi, 2014). In other words, the 
banking union should contribute to repairing the Eurozone, making 
credible the political promise that the monetary union will be a way to 
unify Europe. 
The incomplete design of the banking union risks instead 
perpetuating more of the same internal inconsistencies, which have 
characterised the institutional design of the EU single market 
(Tonveronachi, 2015). If the banking union would have to be one of 
the building blocks towards “a genuine monetary union”, one of its 
major challenges would eventually be to create adequate incentives 
for acceptance by non-euro Member States to limit the powers of the 
financial safety net at the national level in favour of an increased role 
of European institutions.  
The compromise of making the banking union compulsory for all 
euro countries, and optional for all those non-euro countries which 
intend to join, has been perhaps the only path open during an 
emergency. Two major problems limit, however, the attractiveness of 
the banking union in the perspective of non-euro countries: 
uncertainty about the political commitment needed for a credible 
European financial safety net, and the unequal treatment of euro and 
non-euro countries in SSM decision-making processes and in access to 
the ESM. With these flaws, the banking union seems not yet to be an 
effective way to reach the objective of solving the conflicts between 
home and host countries, which caused fragmentation in the European 
banking market. The fact that in the evaluations of non-euro countries 
there are more disadvantages than advantages to joining the banking 
union would appear to confirm that a ‘federal bank supervision’ is 
inconsistent with the perceived interests of several countries. This 
only makes us once again wonder whether ‘more Europe’ is the best 
solution for a Europe that is not – and does not want to become – a 
federal state. 
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